Sto leggendo un link postato tempo addietro da Richard. Mi sono imbattuto in un brano che mi incuriosisce:
Conosco bene il primo argomento, ma meno quello che ho evidenziato. Qualcuno (
) sa spiegarmelo a grandi linee? E' l'analogo dei limiti della formalizzazione assiomatica completa in aritmetica?
The most discussed counterarguments against the validity of such strong reductionist approaches are qualia arguments, which emphasize the impossibility for materialist accounts to properly incorporate the quality of the subjective experience of a mental state, the “what it is like” (Nagel 1974) to be in that state. This leads to a gap between third-person and first-person accounts for which Chalmers (1995) has coined the notion of the “hard problem of consciousness”. Another, less well known counterargument is that the physical domain itself is not causally closed. Any solution of fundamental equations of motion (be it experimentally, numerically, or analytically) requires to fix boundary conditions and initial conditions which are not given by the fundamental laws of nature (Primas 2002). This causal gap applies to classical physics as well as quantum physics, where a basic indeterminacy due to collapse make it even more challenging.
![Big Grin](https://www.bodyweb.com/core/images/icons/icon10.gif)
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