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[ma_75]

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000317
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ECON, KDEM, KCOR, RS
SUBJECT: THE LUZKHOV DILEMMA
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reason: 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov remains a loyal member of United Russia, with a reputation for ensuring that the city has the resources it needs to function smoothly. Questions increasingly arise regarding Luzhkov’s connections to the criminal world and the impact of these ties on governance. Luzhkov remains in a solid position due to his value as a consistent deliverer of votes for the ruling party. Unfortunately, the shadowy world of corrupt business practices under Luzhkov continues in Moscow, with corrupt officials requiring bribes from businesses attempting to operate in the city. End Summary.
Overview: The Kremlin’s Luzhkov Dilemma
---------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov is the embodiment of political dilemma for the Kremlin. A loyal, founding member of United Russia and a trusted deliverer of votes and influence for the ruling party and its leader, Prime Minister Putin, Luzhkov’s connections to Moscow’s business community -- the big and legitimate as well as the marginal and corrupt -- has enabled him to call for support when he needs it, to deliver votes for United Russia, or to ensure that the city has the resources it needs to function smoothly. Luzhkov’s national reputation as the man who governs the ungovernable, who cleans the streets, keeps the Metro running and maintains order in Europe’s largest metropolis of almost 11 million people, earns him a certain amount of slack from government and party leaders. He oversaw what even United Russia insiders acknowledge was a dirty, compromised election for the Moscow City Duma in October, and yet received only a slap on the wrist from President Medvedev.
¶3. (C) Muscovites are increasingly questioning the standard operating procedures of their chief executive, a man who, as of 2007, they no longer directly elect. Luzhkov’s connections to the criminal world and the impact that these ties have had on governance and development in Moscow are increasingly a matter of public discussion. Although Luzhkov was successful in winning court-ordered damages from opposition leader Boris Nemtsov for his recent publication “Luzhkov: An Accounting,” Nemtsov and his Solidarity-movement allies were heartened by the fact that the judge did not award damages on the basis of the corruption accusations themselves, but rather on a libel technicality.
¶4. (C) Few believe that Luzhkov will voluntarily relinquish his post prior to 2012, when the Moscow City Duma must submit a list of mayoral candidates to Medvedev for his selection. United Russia will probably call on Luzhkov’s political machine and his genuine public support to deliver votes for them in the 2011 State Duma elections, as well as the 2012 Presidential contest. With no apparent successor in line, and with no ambitions beyond remaining mayor, Luzhkov is in a solid position. The evidence of his involvement -- or at least association -- with corruption remains significant. This cable presents that side of Luzhkov -- one that bears not only on Luzhkov and his handling of local politics, but on Putin and Medvedev as they move toward the 2012 elections.
Background on Moscow’s Criminal World
-------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The Moscow city government’s direct links to criminality have led some to call it “dysfunctional,” and to assert that the government operates more as a kleptocracy than a government. Criminal elements enjoy a “krysha” (a term from the criminal/mafia world literally meaning “roof” or protection) that runs through the police, the Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and the prosecutor’s office, as well as throughout the Moscow city government bureaucracy. Analysts identify a three-tiered structure in Moscow’s criminal world. Luzhkov is at the top. The FSB, MVD, and militia are at the second level. Finally, ordinary criminals and corrupt inspectors are at the lowest level. This is an inefficient system in which criminal groups fill a void in some areas because the city is not providing some services.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Moscow’s ethnic criminal groups do business and give paybacks. It is the federal headquarters of the parties, not the criminal groups, who decide who will participate in politics. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the political parties are the ones with the political clout; therefore, they have some power over these criminal groups.
MOSCOW 00000317 002 OF 003
Crime groups work with municipal bureaucrats, but at a low level. For example, the Armenians and Georgians were formerly heavily involved in the gambling business before city officials closed the gambling facilities. These ethnic groups needed protection from law enforcement crackdowns, so they sought cooperation with the municipal bureaucrats. In such scenarios, crime groups paid the Moscow police for protection.
Luzhkov’s Links to Criminal Figures
-----------------------------------
¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
¶8. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov used criminal money to support his rise to power and has been involved with bribes and deals regarding lucrative construction contracts throughout Moscow. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov’s friends and associates (including recently deceased crime boss Vyacheslav Ivankov and reputedly corrupt Duma Deputy XXXXXXXXXXXX) are “bandits.” XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the Moscow government has links to many different criminal groups and it regularly takes cash bribes from businesses. The people under Luzhkov maintain these criminal connections. Recently, ultranationalist LDPR opposition party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy strongly criticized Luzhkov and called for him to step down, claiming that Luzhkov’s government was the “most criminal” in Russian history. This remarkable denunciation, carried on state TV flagship Channel One, was widely seen as an indirect Kremlin rebuke of Luzhkov.
¶9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us everyone knows that Russia’s laws do not work. The Moscow system is based on officials making money. The government bureaucrats, FSB, MVD, police, and prosecutor’s offices all accept bribes. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that everything depends on the Kremlin and he thought that Luzhkov, as well as many mayors and governors, pay off key insiders in the Kremlin. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the vertical works because people are paying bribes all the way to the top. He told us that people often witness officials going into the Kremlin with large suitcases and bodyguards, and he speculated that the suitcases are full of money. The governors collect money based on bribes, almost resembling a tax system, throughout their regions. XXXXXXXXXXXX described how there are parallel structures in the regions in which people are able to pay their leaders. For instance, the FSB, MVD, and militia all have distinct money collection systems. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that deputies generally have to buy their seats in the government. They need money to get to the top, but once they are there, their positions become quite lucrative money making opportunities. Bureaucrats in Moscow are notorious for doing all kinds of illegal business to get extra money.
¶10. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov is following orders from the Kremlin to not go after Moscow’s criminal groups. For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that it was only a public relations stunt from Putin to close gambling. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he did not see the sense in suitcases of money going into the Kremlin since it would be easier to open a secret account in Cyprus. He speculated that the Moscow police heads have a secret war chest of money. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that this money is likely used to solve problems that the Kremlin decides, such as rigging elections. It can be accessed as a resource for when orders come from above, for example, for bribes or to pay off people when necessary. XXXXXXXXXXXX postulated that the Kremlin might say to a governor that he can rule a certain territory but in exchange he must do what the Kremlin says.
¶11. (C) Notwithstanding Luzhkov’s solid position, some of our contacts believe that cracks have appeared in his armor, due
MOSCOW 00000317 003 OF 003
to his corrupt activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov has many enemies because his wife has the most lucrative business deals in Moscow and many people think Luzhkov has received too much money. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that Luzhkov is “on his way out,” although he acknowledged that the Kremlin has not identified a suitable replacement yet. Issues such as corruption and traffic congestion have, to a certain degree, eroded Luzhkov’s popularity. Putin, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, will likely pick the quietest and least expected person to replace Luzhkov.
In Moscow, Everyone Needs a “Krysha”
------------------------------------
¶12. (C) According to many observers, the lawless criminal climate in Russia makes it difficult for businesses to survive without being defended by some type of protection. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained how bribes work in Moscow: a cafe owner pays the local police chief via cash through a courier. He needs to pay a certain negotiated amount over a certain profit. The high prices of goods in Moscow cover these hidden costs. Sometimes people receive “bad protection” in the sense that the “krysha” extorts an excessive amount of money. As a result, they cannot make enough of a profit to maintain their businesses. If people attempt to forego protection, they will instantly be shut down. For example, officials from the fire or sanitation service will appear at the business and invent a violation. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, everyone has bought into the idea of protection in Moscow, so it has become a norm. In general, Muscovites have little freedom to speak out against corrupt activities and are afraid of their leaders.
¶13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that Moscow business owners understand that it is best to get protection from the MVD and FSB (rather than organized crime groups) since they not only have more guns, resources, and power than criminal groups, but they are also protected by the law. For this reason, protection from criminal gangs is no longer so high in demand. Police and MVD collect money from small businesses while the FSB collects from big businesses. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the FSB “krysha” is allegedly the best protection. He told us that, while the MVD and FSB both have close links to Solntsevo, the FSB is the real “krysha” for Solntsevo. This system is not an incentive for smaller businesses and nobody is immune; even rich people who think they are protected get arrested. According to Transparency International’s 2009 survey, bribery costs Russia USD 300 billion a year, or about 18 percent of its gross domestic product. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the “krysha” system has led to an erosion of police internal discipline. For instance, young police officers spend their money buying luxury vehicles that a normal worker could never afford.
Comment
-------
¶14. (S) Despite Medvedev’s stated anti-corruption campaign, the extent of corruption in Moscow remains pervasive with Mayor Luzhkov at the top of the pyramid. Luzhkov oversees a system in which it appears that almost everyone at every level is involved in some form of corruption or criminal behavior. Putin and Medvedev’s dilemma is deciding when Luzhkov becomes a bigger liability than asset. While public sentiment against Luzhkov has grown since the “tainted” elections in October 2009, United Russia’s leadership knows that he has been a loyal supporter who can deliver voter support. Ousting Luzhkov before he is ready to go could create major difficulties because he could link others in the government to the corruption. While reforming Luzhkov’s questionable activities might seem like the right thing to do, for now keeping him in place, efficiently running the city, is United Russia’s best option. Ultimately, the tandem will put Luzhkov out to pasture, like it has done with fellow long-term regional leaders like Sverdlovsk oblast governor Edward Rossel and Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaymiyev.



Il sindaco di Mosca è una specie di Cosentino
Beyrle

[bersiker1980]

GO ASSANGE GOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


P.S qualcuno mi risponda su Frattini, vi prego. Non ce la faccio a vederlo così nervoso

[ma_75]

Questa è grossa. Putin avrebbe interessi economici personali nella vendita di GAS all'Europa, attraverso società opache. Non mi stupirei, nei prossimi giorni, di veder saltare fuori il nome di un ometto a noi ben noto come suo socio

Monday, 24 November 2008, 06:35

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003380

• SIPDIS
  DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT
  EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR)
  DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF
  EO 12958 DECL: 11/21/2018
  TAGS EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, RS">RS
  SUBJECT: (C) OIL TRADERS: PIPELINE EXPORTS TO EUROPE STILL
  OPAQUE; SEABORNE TRADE MORE COMMERCIAL
  REF: A. MOSCOW 2880 B. MOSCOW 2632
  Classified By: Econ MC Eric T. Schultz for reasons 1.4 (b/d)
  Summary
  1. The Moscow embassy lifts the lid on Russia's opaque oil industry, and examines the rise and rise of the 'Kremlin-connected oil trader Gunvor'. Key passages highlighted in yellow
  
  
  
  -------
  SUMMARY
  -------
  1. (C) The oil trading business in Russia has long been opaque, benefiting politically connected firms such as the secretive oil trading firm Gunvor. Contacts tell us, however, that the business has lately become more transparent because seaborne trade is now largely conducted via commercial tenders and terms. They caution, however, that pipeline exports to Europe remain problematic. XXXXXXXXXXX, for instance, told us he believes the recent supply reduction to the Czech Republic (ref A) was politically coordinated. To the extent that a shift toward greater transparency has taken hold, it is another example of the role of international commerce and finance in forcing Russian businesses to behave commercially. End summary.
  --------------------------
  RUSSIAN OIL TRADING OPAQUE
  --------------------------
  2. (SBU) Oil traders at major Western companies explained to us recently that the market for physical oil trades is very developed globally and has two segments. One is comprised of major international oil companies who trade oil largely to optimize their own global operations -- to ensure the right amounts of oil are transferred to the right facilities at the lowest cost. The other is comprised of companies such as Glencore, Vitol, and others who serve as intermediaries simply trying to make money buying and selling oil using their marketing, shipping, or risk tolerance advantage.
  3. (C) According to these experts, oil trading in Russia has had a reputation for secretive deals involving intermediary companies with unknown owners and beneficiaries. Oil exports from state-owned or state-influenced oil companies have reportedly been funneled through favored oil traders, potentially yielding billions of dollars of profits for these companies. Of particular note in the Russian oil trading business is the Swiss firm Gunvor. The company is rumored to be one of Putin's sources of undisclosed wealth, and is owned by Gennady Timchenko, who is rumored to be a former KGB colleague of Putin's.
  4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX estimates that Gunvor may control up to 50% of total Russian oil exports. He and his lawyer told us recently that it is impossible to know the extent of Gunvor's penetration of the market, however, because the companies involved refuse to disclose this information. (Note: Gunvor claims in its glossy but uninformative brochure that it "handles a third of Russia's seaborne oil exports." End note.) As XXXXXXXXXXX has discovered, verifiable information on the volumes and terms of oil trades is very difficult to come by.
  ----------------------------
  BUT BECOMING MORE COMMERCIAL
  ----------------------------
  5. (C) Managers at two western oil companies, however, explained to us recently that oil trading in Russia has taken a welcome turn toward greater transparency thanks to open tenders for seaborne exports. XXXXXXXXXXX told us in a recent meeting that oil trading via Russian seaports is now, in his view, "completely commercial." XXXXXXXXXXX explained that during the last year and especially since Medvedev's inauguration, there has been a deliberate and successful push by the state to ensure transparency and commercial terms for most of the oil exported from Russia via ports.
  6. (C)XXXXXXXXXXX claimed his view is not just conjecture. He said it comes directly from hard numbers and evidence that he sees from his participation in tenders by Rosneft, Lukoil, and other major Russian oil companies. He said that while
  MOSCOW 00003380 002 OF 003
  Gunvor rose based on the "administrative support" of the GOR, the government came to realize it could no longer promote Gunvor at the expense of, for example, state-owned Rosneft and Gazpromneft. XXXXXXXXXXX said he believes the trend toward greater transparency in seaborne exports will continue XXXXXXXXXXX.
  7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX painted a similar picture of oil trading in Russia, calling seaborne trade "open and transparent." He added that domestic trading, while depending on middlemen, is now also largely commercial. XXXXXXXXXXX told us the Russian oil trading market is among the most difficult in the world, but that it also offers good opportunities and that XXXXXXXXXXX has built a "healthy business" here. He said he has seen great changes in the 1 1/2 years he has been in his current job, and suggested that much of the change has come as a result of the government's push for greater transparency in the economy as a whole. He added that he believes this push has largely been driven by the financing needs of the state-owned companies.
  8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX was less impressed by the degree of transparency in the business, even for seaborne oil exports. He told us recently that while there are more open tenders and more participants for seaborne exports, "the same firms seem to often win." He suggested that favored firms may get inside information and a "second chance" to bid. XXXXXXXXXXX agreed, however, that there has been a trend toward greater transparency, but cautioned that it is far from an "open and commercial" market. He highlighted Rosneft as a company that has evolved toward greater transparency, and Surgutneftegaz (another reported source of Putin's illicit wealth) as a company that has not.
  ------------------------------------------
  PIPELINE EXPORTS TO EUROPE STILL A PROBLEM
  ------------------------------------------
  9. (C) All three company representatives noted, however, that the trend toward greater transparency stops with seaborne trade. They all said Russian oil exports to Europe through pipelines, especially through the southern Druzhba pipeline, is still a very opaque business. XXXXXXXXXXX said pipeline exports, in general, are inherently more political than exports from ports, and that the trade through southern Druzhba is so opaque that "no one knows who is getting what." XXXXXXXXXXX said many in the business "wonder what goes on between buyers and sellers" along that route.
  10. (C) As an example, XXXXXXXXXXX specifically cited the recent oil supply reductions from Russia to the Czech Republic (ref A). He said that despite claims by officials that "middlemen" were the problem, he did not believe that to be the case. He said producers generally offer their oil using formulas that include some premium on top of a base price, depending on the export market. He explained that just prior to the supply reduction to the Czech Republic (where Shell has a stake in a refinery), all producers demanded the exact same premium, $1.25 per barrel, which he said was 4 to 5 times the previous figure for that route. He believed this price increase was coordinated, and resulted in the re-routing of oil exports away from the Czech Republic.
  11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said that in the case of the Czech Republic, the refineries involved had access to other supplies, but that there was indeed an additional cost associated with obtaining alternate supplies. He said similar demands for higher premiums have occurred with regard to deliveries to a German refinery partly owned by Shell, but that the refinery had more limited access to alternatives. In such cases, XXXXXXXXXXX explained, managers have to decide whether to run refineries at sub-optimal levels, or pay the higher costs.
  12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX also noted that oil exports to Hungary, by Transneft decree, must go through "a certain intermediary" (Gunvor), which adds one dollar to each barrel. He said in a competitive market, by contrast, an oil trader might add anywhere from five to 20 cents "maximum" to the price of a barrel of oil.
  -------
  COMMENT
  MOSCOW 00003380 003 OF 003
  -------
  13. (C) Oil traders play an important role in the market, helping provide liquidity and optimizing the operations of oil refiners and producers. However, while it appears that the GOR has realized that the more transparent and commercial the trading business, the better it is for Russia's oil sector, it unfortunately has not decided to apply this realization uniformly. Greed, corruption, and geopolitical concerns still trump efficiency, especially with regard to certain export routes to Europe and with regard to certain connected oil traders, such as Gunvor. End comment. BEYRLE
  

[Dan Master's]

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000317
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ECON, KDEM, KCOR, RS
SUBJECT: THE LUZKHOV DILEMMA
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reason: 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov remains a loyal member of United Russia, with a reputation for ensuring that the city has the resources it needs to function smoothly. Questions increasingly arise regarding Luzhkov’s connections to the criminal world and the impact of these ties on governance. Luzhkov remains in a solid position due to his value as a consistent deliverer of votes for the ruling party. Unfortunately, the shadowy world of corrupt business practices under Luzhkov continues in Moscow, with corrupt officials requiring bribes from businesses attempting to operate in the city. End Summary.
Overview: The Kremlin’s Luzhkov Dilemma
---------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov is the embodiment of political dilemma for the Kremlin. A loyal, founding member of United Russia and a trusted deliverer of votes and influence for the ruling party and its leader, Prime Minister Putin, Luzhkov’s connections to Moscow’s business community -- the big and legitimate as well as the marginal and corrupt -- has enabled him to call for support when he needs it, to deliver votes for United Russia, or to ensure that the city has the resources it needs to function smoothly. Luzhkov’s national reputation as the man who governs the ungovernable, who cleans the streets, keeps the Metro running and maintains order in Europe’s largest metropolis of almost 11 million people, earns him a certain amount of slack from government and party leaders. He oversaw what even United Russia insiders acknowledge was a dirty, compromised election for the Moscow City Duma in October, and yet received only a slap on the wrist from President Medvedev.
¶3. (C) Muscovites are increasingly questioning the standard operating procedures of their chief executive, a man who, as of 2007, they no longer directly elect. Luzhkov’s connections to the criminal world and the impact that these ties have had on governance and development in Moscow are increasingly a matter of public discussion. Although Luzhkov was successful in winning court-ordered damages from opposition leader Boris Nemtsov for his recent publication “Luzhkov: An Accounting,” Nemtsov and his Solidarity-movement allies were heartened by the fact that the judge did not award damages on the basis of the corruption accusations themselves, but rather on a libel technicality.
¶4. (C) Few believe that Luzhkov will voluntarily relinquish his post prior to 2012, when the Moscow City Duma must submit a list of mayoral candidates to Medvedev for his selection. United Russia will probably call on Luzhkov’s political machine and his genuine public support to deliver votes for them in the 2011 State Duma elections, as well as the 2012 Presidential contest. With no apparent successor in line, and with no ambitions beyond remaining mayor, Luzhkov is in a solid position. The evidence of his involvement -- or at least association -- with corruption remains significant. This cable presents that side of Luzhkov -- one that bears not only on Luzhkov and his handling of local politics, but on Putin and Medvedev as they move toward the 2012 elections.
Background on Moscow’s Criminal World
-------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The Moscow city government’s direct links to criminality have led some to call it “dysfunctional,” and to assert that the government operates more as a kleptocracy than a government. Criminal elements enjoy a “krysha” (a term from the criminal/mafia world literally meaning “roof” or protection) that runs through the police, the Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and the prosecutor’s office, as well as throughout the Moscow city government bureaucracy. Analysts identify a three-tiered structure in Moscow’s criminal world. Luzhkov is at the top. The FSB, MVD, and militia are at the second level. Finally, ordinary criminals and corrupt inspectors are at the lowest level. This is an inefficient system in which criminal groups fill a void in some areas because the city is not providing some services.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Moscow’s ethnic criminal groups do business and give paybacks. It is the federal headquarters of the parties, not the criminal groups, who decide who will participate in politics. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the political parties are the ones with the political clout; therefore, they have some power over these criminal groups.
MOSCOW 00000317 002 OF 003
Crime groups work with municipal bureaucrats, but at a low level. For example, the Armenians and Georgians were formerly heavily involved in the gambling business before city officials closed the gambling facilities. These ethnic groups needed protection from law enforcement crackdowns, so they sought cooperation with the municipal bureaucrats. In such scenarios, crime groups paid the Moscow police for protection.
Luzhkov’s Links to Criminal Figures
-----------------------------------
¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
¶8. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov used criminal money to support his rise to power and has been involved with bribes and deals regarding lucrative construction contracts throughout Moscow. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov’s friends and associates (including recently deceased crime boss Vyacheslav Ivankov and reputedly corrupt Duma Deputy XXXXXXXXXXXX) are “bandits.” XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the Moscow government has links to many different criminal groups and it regularly takes cash bribes from businesses. The people under Luzhkov maintain these criminal connections. Recently, ultranationalist LDPR opposition party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy strongly criticized Luzhkov and called for him to step down, claiming that Luzhkov’s government was the “most criminal” in Russian history. This remarkable denunciation, carried on state TV flagship Channel One, was widely seen as an indirect Kremlin rebuke of Luzhkov.
¶9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us everyone knows that Russia’s laws do not work. The Moscow system is based on officials making money. The government bureaucrats, FSB, MVD, police, and prosecutor’s offices all accept bribes. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that everything depends on the Kremlin and he thought that Luzhkov, as well as many mayors and governors, pay off key insiders in the Kremlin. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the vertical works because people are paying bribes all the way to the top. He told us that people often witness officials going into the Kremlin with large suitcases and bodyguards, and he speculated that the suitcases are full of money. The governors collect money based on bribes, almost resembling a tax system, throughout their regions. XXXXXXXXXXXX described how there are parallel structures in the regions in which people are able to pay their leaders. For instance, the FSB, MVD, and militia all have distinct money collection systems. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that deputies generally have to buy their seats in the government. They need money to get to the top, but once they are there, their positions become quite lucrative money making opportunities. Bureaucrats in Moscow are notorious for doing all kinds of illegal business to get extra money.
¶10. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov is following orders from the Kremlin to not go after Moscow’s criminal groups. For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that it was only a public relations stunt from Putin to close gambling. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he did not see the sense in suitcases of money going into the Kremlin since it would be easier to open a secret account in Cyprus. He speculated that the Moscow police heads have a secret war chest of money. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that this money is likely used to solve problems that the Kremlin decides, such as rigging elections. It can be accessed as a resource for when orders come from above, for example, for bribes or to pay off people when necessary. XXXXXXXXXXXX postulated that the Kremlin might say to a governor that he can rule a certain territory but in exchange he must do what the Kremlin says.
¶11. (C) Notwithstanding Luzhkov’s solid position, some of our contacts believe that cracks have appeared in his armor, due
MOSCOW 00000317 003 OF 003
to his corrupt activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov has many enemies because his wife has the most lucrative business deals in Moscow and many people think Luzhkov has received too much money. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that Luzhkov is “on his way out,” although he acknowledged that the Kremlin has not identified a suitable replacement yet. Issues such as corruption and traffic congestion have, to a certain degree, eroded Luzhkov’s popularity. Putin, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, will likely pick the quietest and least expected person to replace Luzhkov.
In Moscow, Everyone Needs a “Krysha”
------------------------------------
¶12. (C) According to many observers, the lawless criminal climate in Russia makes it difficult for businesses to survive without being defended by some type of protection. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained how bribes work in Moscow: a cafe owner pays the local police chief via cash through a courier. He needs to pay a certain negotiated amount over a certain profit. The high prices of goods in Moscow cover these hidden costs. Sometimes people receive “bad protection” in the sense that the “krysha” extorts an excessive amount of money. As a result, they cannot make enough of a profit to maintain their businesses. If people attempt to forego protection, they will instantly be shut down. For example, officials from the fire or sanitation service will appear at the business and invent a violation. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, everyone has bought into the idea of protection in Moscow, so it has become a norm. In general, Muscovites have little freedom to speak out against corrupt activities and are afraid of their leaders.
¶13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that Moscow business owners understand that it is best to get protection from the MVD and FSB (rather than organized crime groups) since they not only have more guns, resources, and power than criminal groups, but they are also protected by the law. For this reason, protection from criminal gangs is no longer so high in demand. Police and MVD collect money from small businesses while the FSB collects from big businesses. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the FSB “krysha” is allegedly the best protection. He told us that, while the MVD and FSB both have close links to Solntsevo, the FSB is the real “krysha” for Solntsevo. This system is not an incentive for smaller businesses and nobody is immune; even rich people who think they are protected get arrested. According to Transparency International’s 2009 survey, bribery costs Russia USD 300 billion a year, or about 18 percent of its gross domestic product. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the “krysha” system has led to an erosion of police internal discipline. For instance, young police officers spend their money buying luxury vehicles that a normal worker could never afford.
Comment
-------
¶14. (S) Despite Medvedev’s stated anti-corruption campaign, the extent of corruption in Moscow remains pervasive with Mayor Luzhkov at the top of the pyramid. Luzhkov oversees a system in which it appears that almost everyone at every level is involved in some form of corruption or criminal behavior. Putin and Medvedev’s dilemma is deciding when Luzhkov becomes a bigger liability than asset. While public sentiment against Luzhkov has grown since the “tainted” elections in October 2009, United Russia’s leadership knows that he has been a loyal supporter who can deliver voter support. Ousting Luzhkov before he is ready to go could create major difficulties because he could link others in the government to the corruption. While reforming Luzhkov’s questionable activities might seem like the right thing to do, for now keeping him in place, efficiently running the city, is United Russia’s best option. Ultimately, the tandem will put Luzhkov out to pasture, like it has done with fellow long-term regional leaders like Sverdlovsk oblast governor Edward Rossel and Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaymiyev.



Il sindaco di Mosca è una specie di Cosentino
Beyrle

Tra l'altro è stato silurato da poco...ufficialmente perchè se ne stava in vacanza durante gli incendi di quest'estate, in realtà perché era corrotto fino al midollo e sua moglie era diventata la donna più ricca della Russia o giù di lì "lavorando" nelle costruzioni.

[Sean]

Gli americani sono convinti che B. tragga profitti personali dagli affari fatti con Putin. Così si esprime l'ex ambasciatore Spogli nel 2009:

«L'ambasciatore della Georgia a Roma - scrive Spogli - ci ha riferito che il suo governo ritiene che Putin abbia promesso a Berlusconi una percentuale su ogni pipeline sviluppata da Gazprom in coordinamento con l'Eni».

La base di questa amicizia è difficile da stabilire ma molti interlocutori ci hanno detto che Berlusconi crede che Putin, un «tycoon», ha più fiducia in Berlusconi che in qualunque leader europeo (...)Berlusconi ammira lo stile macho, decisionista e autoritario del suo modo di governare(...) «Il premier e i suoi traggono profitti personali

. Quando solleviamo la questione della Russia con i nostri contatti nel Pdl loro di solito ci fanno il nome di Valentino Valentini, un membro del Parlamento e una specie di figura ombra che lavora come uomo chiave di Berlusconi in Russia sebbene non abbia neanche una segretaria. Valentini, che parla russo e va in Russia molte volte al mese, appare molto spesso al fianco di Berlusconi quando incontra altri leader mondiali. Non è chiaro cosa faccia a Mosca durante le sue frequenti visite ma si dice che curi gli interessi commerciali di Berlusconi nel Paese.

Tutti i nostri interlocutori - al ministero degli Esteri, nell'ufficio del premier, nel Pdl e anche nell'Eni - raccontano che Berlusconi decide la politica italiana sulla Russia da solo, senza cercare o accettare consigli. Tutti sono riluttanti ad affrontarlo anche quando sta dando il suo peggio sulla Russia. Nel novembre del 2008, dopo una conferenza stampa disastrosa nella quale, tra l'altro, il premier ha descritto l'allargamento della Nato, il riconoscimento dell'indipendenza del Kosovo e lo scudo missilistico come «provocazioni americane» alla Russia, i funzionari del governo italiano hanno messo la testa sotto la sabbia. In risposta alle nostre obiezioni il ministero degli Affari Esteri e lo staff del primo ministro ci hanno mandato direttamente dal premier, invece che portagli la cattiva notizia che le sue parole avevano contrariato non solo gli americani ma anche gli altri membri del gruppo di contatto per i Balcani, per non menzionare i Cechi e i Polacchi. Anche il ministro degli Esteri Frattini ammette di non esercitare alcuna influenza su Berlusconi sulla Russia.

http://www.corriere.it/esteri/10_dicembre_02/olimpio_berlusconi-cremlino_ad315e36-fddf-11df-b89b-00144f02aabc.shtml

Bene. Invece di incriminare Assange, le procure aprano inchieste penali su queste notizie di reato che riguardano i nostri.

[Leonida]

pare che le relazioni tra i due si siano cementificate proprio quando silvio è venuto a sapere che la russa sia uno stato mafioso

[Sean]

La nostra stampa, la cara libera stampa a libro paga dei poteri forti:

"C'è anche il sospetto che l'Eni abbia dei giornalisti sul proprio libro paga". E' quanto si legge in uno dei cablogrammi ottenuti da Wikileaks e inviati dall'ex ambasciatore americano a Roma Ronald Spogli.

Per Assange forse le ore sono contate:

Il fondatore di Wikileaks, Julian Assange, sarebbe in Gran Bretagna e la polizia saprebbe esattamente dove, ma sarebbe in attesa di chiarimenti sul mandato d'arresto internazionale emesso contro di lui dall'Interpol. Lo riporta l'Indipendent.

L'Alta Corte svedese ha respinto il ricorso presentati dai legali di Julian Assange contro il mandato di arresto per stupro spiccato dalla procura di Stoccoloma.

[ma_75]

"Julian Assage è un genio del male. Non è un uomo che lotta per la libertà nè per l'uomo della trasparenza": lo ha affermato il sottosegretario degli Esteri, Alfredo Mantica, oggi a Trieste. Per Mantica Assange "è un genio-hacker di queste cose terribili che sono i sistemi informatici, che ha rivoluzionato il mondo. Perchè da qualche giorno, da quando ha pubblicato questi file, è chiaro che il mondo non è più quello di prima"

Quelle cose terribili che sono i sistemi informatici
Cioè Assange, è troppo semplice beffare dei pirloni come questo che manco sa come si accende un computer

[Leonida]

aaaaaaaaaahahah ma chi è questo , mia nonna? ahahahah 'o vùvùvù.

[CRI PV]

pare che un cugino di putin faccia lo stalliere ad arcore

[Barone Bizzio]

Il famoso Viktor Manganov...

[KURTANGLE]

" genio del male" haahahahhaha

[germanomosconi]

scommetto che su libero e il giornale hanno dato la notizia degli interessi personali del premier sulla vicenda putin

[odisseo]

NUOVE CARTE

Wikileaks, le feste e le ore piccole
fanno male alla salute di Berlusconi

Il documento: il premier non si riposa abbastanza
e i test medici hanno dato risultati «disastrosi»

NUOVE CARTE
Wikileaks, le feste e le ore piccole
fanno male alla salute di Berlusconi
Il documento: il premier non si riposa abbastanza
e i test medici hanno dato risultati «disastrosi»
MILANO - L'abitudine di fare tardi la notte e di partecipare alle feste ha come risultato che Silvio Berlusconi non si riposa abbastanza e il premier italiano starebbe pagando un pesante pedaggio: «E' fisicamente e politicamente debole». E' quanto risulta da uno dei documenti diffusi da Wikileaks e riportato dall'edizione online del quotidiano britannico Guardian. Secondo il documento, che ha la data dell'ottobre 2009 e che cita «politici amici» in contatto con l'ambasciata americana di Roma, i test medici effettuati sul presidente del Consiglio hanno dato come risultato «un disastro completo». «Siamo tutti preoccupati per la sua salute», hanno detto le stesse fonti a un funzionario dell'ambasciata.
«CRESCENTE SERIE DI SCANDALI» - Secondo il «summary» della versione integrale del documento americano dell'ottobre 2009, in cui i nomi delle fonti confidenziali sono stati censurati (ma secondo un riassunto diffuso dal quotidiano spagnolo El Pais si tratterebbe del sottosegretario alla presidenza del Consiglio Gianni Letta (che smentisce) e del senatore del Pdl Giampiero Cantoni), «una crescente serie di scandali, decisioni sfavorevoli della magistratura e problemi di salute hanno indebolito il premier italiano e spingono gli ex alleati a scommettere sulla sua longevità politica. In un ambiente politico in via di peggioramento, il continuo parlare di cospirazioni spesso impedisce un reale dibattito politico e distrae il governo Berlusconi dal perseguire, o perfino sviluppare, un'agenda politica coerente».
BREVE ASSOPIMENTO - La nota riporta, parlando della stanchezza del presidente del Consiglio italiano, che durante la prima vista di cortesia del nuovo ambasciatore americano a Roma David Thorne, Berlusconi «si è assopito» per un attimo ed è sembrato «stanco e distratto» a un evento che ha avuto luogo il 19 ottobre al quale era presente lo stesso ambasciatore.
SERVIZI SEGRETI - Le fonti confidenziali dell'ambasciata riferiscono che Berlusconi temeva che dietro i presunti scandali sessuali con il coinvolgimento di ragazze minorenni ci fossero i servizi segreti che volevano incastrarlo. Anche in relazione al caso Marrazzo (il presidente della regione Lazio ricattato per i suoi rapporti con un trans) Berlusconi era convinto di non potersi più fidare dell'intelligence italiana. In un'altra conversazione, Umberto Bossi avrebbe detto all'ambasciatore in persona che «alcuni personaggi facenti capo alla criminalità organizzata hanno probabilmente messo in piedi una trappola per Berlusconi su alcuni scandali sessuali, me che nessuno nega che Berlusconi ha messo volontariamente la testa nel cappio».

LA VISITA A PUTIN - Il documento ricorda anche la vicenda del viaggio di tre giorni in Russia fatto da Berlusconi per celebrare il compleanno di Putin e prima del quale il presidente del Consiglio diffuse una nota per specificare che il viaggio «era una faccenda strettamente privato e personale».

http://www.corriere.it/politica/10_dicembre_02/wikileaks-berlusconi-salute-rischio_9d71a960-fe1b-11df-b89b-00144f02aabc.shtml

[sotiris]

Gli americani sono convinti che B. tragga profitti personali dagli affari fatti con Putin. Così si esprime l'ex ambasciatore Spogli nel 2009:

«L'ambasciatore della Georgia a Roma - scrive Spogli - ci ha riferito che il suo governo ritiene che Putin abbia promesso a Berlusconi una percentuale su ogni pipeline sviluppata da Gazprom in coordinamento con l'Eni».

La base di questa amicizia è difficile da stabilire ma molti interlocutori ci hanno detto che Berlusconi crede che Putin, un «tycoon», ha più fiducia in Berlusconi che in qualunque leader europeo (...)Berlusconi ammira lo stile macho, decisionista e autoritario del suo modo di governare(...) «Il premier e i suoi traggono profitti personali

. Quando solleviamo la questione della Russia con i nostri contatti nel Pdl loro di solito ci fanno il nome di Valentino Valentini, un membro del Parlamento e una specie di figura ombra che lavora come uomo chiave di Berlusconi in Russia sebbene non abbia neanche una segretaria. Valentini, che parla russo e va in Russia molte volte al mese, appare molto spesso al fianco di Berlusconi quando incontra altri leader mondiali. Non è chiaro cosa faccia a Mosca durante le sue frequenti visite ma si dice che curi gli interessi commerciali di Berlusconi nel Paese.

Tutti i nostri interlocutori - al ministero degli Esteri, nell'ufficio del premier, nel Pdl e anche nell'Eni - raccontano che Berlusconi decide la politica italiana sulla Russia da solo, senza cercare o accettare consigli. Tutti sono riluttanti ad affrontarlo anche quando sta dando il suo peggio sulla Russia. Nel novembre del 2008, dopo una conferenza stampa disastrosa nella quale, tra l'altro, il premier ha descritto l'allargamento della Nato, il riconoscimento dell'indipendenza del Kosovo e lo scudo missilistico come «provocazioni americane» alla Russia, i funzionari del governo italiano hanno messo la testa sotto la sabbia. In risposta alle nostre obiezioni il ministero degli Affari Esteri e lo staff del primo ministro ci hanno mandato direttamente dal premier, invece che portagli la cattiva notizia che le sue parole avevano contrariato non solo gli americani ma anche gli altri membri del gruppo di contatto per i Balcani, per non menzionare i Cechi e i Polacchi. Anche il ministro degli Esteri Frattini ammette di non esercitare alcuna influenza su Berlusconi sulla Russia.

http://www.corriere.it/esteri/10_dicembre_02/olimpio_berlusconi-cremlino_ad315e36-fddf-11df-b89b-00144f02aabc.shtml

Bene. Invece di incriminare Assange, le procure aprano inchieste penali su queste notizie di reato che riguardano i nostri.

Ecco questo mi aspettavo. Già se ne è parlava in media poco noti.
Questo è il motivo per cui frattini si agita tanto. Non certo per i danni alla Diplomazia Internazionale.
Ce ne abbastanza per dare la spallata finale. E senza il berlusca le mezze seghe come lui e i vari gasparri, la russa, bondi, ecc. vaporizzano.